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Leveraged Buyouts 
in the Hospitality Industry: 
Five Years Later 
by 
Elisa S. Moncarz 
Associate Professor 
Florida International University 
School of Hospitality Management 
When the author wrote her first artide for the FIU Hospitalii Review on lever- 
aged buyouts' some five years ago, this business strategy was beginning to 
enjoy increasing pqulatity. S i m  that time leveraged buyouts grew to unprece- 
dented levels both in number and size of transactions. However, following the 
failure of the UAL proposal and the collapse of the junk bond market in 1989, 
there has been a marked slowdown in buyout activity. lhis article examines 
major developments affecting leveraged buyouts over the past five years and 
addresses their future implications for the haspitalily industry. 
The merits and demerits of leveraged buyouts (hereafter LBOs) 
became one of the hottest topics of discussion and debate in the 1980s. 
Indeed, the 1980s may be remembered as the "decade of the LBOs," 
commencing with returns well over 40 percent to LBO participants 
and ending with the collapse of the junk bond market and the finan- 
cial troubles experienced by, Carnpeau and Resorts International. 
The term LBO has been used in a variety of ways. It generally 
refers to an acquiror, which often includes the incumbent manage- 
ment of the acquired company (i.e., management buyouts or MBOs) 
taking a company (or division of a company) private by purchasing 
all the outstanding equity with significant amount of debt financing 
backed by the company's assets. In essence, the transaction involves 
the substitution of debt for equity, and, thus, the resulting private 
firm is said to be "highly leveraged." This huge amount of debt is 
expected to be serviced by a combination of operating income and 
asset dispositions (e.g., selling restaurant divisions or hotel proper- 
ties to other companies). 
A Typical LBO Has Three Main Constituencies: 
management of the company which acquires the company, 
division, or subsidiary it is currently managing, thereby 
entering the world of entrepreneurship. These individuals will 
hold a significant equity stake in the company after the buyout 
is completed. 
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buyout specialists (such as Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts and 
Company or Fortsmann, Little and Co.) that  sponsors the 
going-private transaction while counseling and monitoring the 
LBO company after the buyout. "The LBO specialist arranges 
the debt and equity financing necessary to purchase the  
common stock held by the public and serves as  a financial 
adviser and director of the post-buyout private c~rporation."~ 
lenders or institutional investors who purchase equity and 
lend money to finance the transaction. 
These ownership structures of LBOs are designed both to protect 
the parties who have provided the required financing and to improve 
manager's incentives and implement strategic changes, hence, 
enhancing the company's performance. Accordingly, an  LBO firm 
would normally expect another restructuring within several years by 
selling the company back to the public or a third party. 
One of the contributing factors to the LBO popularity is that 
major participants stand to gain by the transaction, as follows: 
Selling public shareholders receive a premium over the market 
value of the stock. 
Management acquires ownership of a company it is already 
running and the opportunity to enhance its value and thus 
receive future rewards directly from its efforts. 
Lending institutions receive a high yield investment and a new 
client with the incentive to grow. 
LBOs Have Experienced Major Growth in the Past Decade 
Although LBOs have been in existence since the 1960s, not until 
the '80s did they become a quantitatively significant component of 
overall merger and acquisition activity. "The number of going private 
transactions in 1988 was nearly eight times that of 1979."3 
"The recessionary periods of the '70s and early '80s prompted 
the sale of many companies, divisions and s~bsidiar ies ."~ With 
ever-increasing pressure to  remain competitive and  to  use 
resources more effectively, hospitality companies had to reasses 
their competitive strategy, thereby contributing to the LBO boom 
of the 1980s. Moreover, a very favorable economic environment in 
the mid and late '80s, accompanied by rising stock prices, facili- 
tated the sale of companies a t  a higher price while carrying a 
heavy debt load. 
The LBO phenomenon experienced in the 1980s was also the 
result of favorable tax laws. Three tax incentives have been proposed 
as important sources of wealth gains in LBOs: "the tax deductibility 
of interest payments on corporate debt, increased depreciation 
deductions associated with the step-up of assets (especially signifi- 
cant before the Tax Reform Act of 1986), and the tax advantages of 
Employee Stock Option Plans (ESOP)."5 
FIU Hospitality Review, Volume 9, Number 1, 1991
Contents © 1991 by FIU Hospitality Review. The reproduction of any
artwork, editorial or other material is expressly prohibited without
written permission from the publisher.
A new theory was presented by Margaret Mendenhall Blair, a 
research associate a t  the Brookings Institute, concerning the 
reasons for the LBO boom of the 1980s. Blair contends that "the 
upsurge of real (inflation-adjusted) interest rates in the '80s to 
unprecedented levels coincided with declines of rate of returns of 
physical assets. The high real interest rates sharply cut the 
number of investment projects by raising the hurdle rate and 
resulted in more cash flows that managers could invest inter- 
n a l l ~ . " ~  Accordingly, this triggered stockholders' dissatisfaction 
and stepped up pressures on corporate managers to increase the 
payout to shareholders. 
Media Attention Is Focused on LBOs in the Late '80s 
The news media, Congress, and the regulatory community 
focused considerable attention on LBOs during 1988 and 1989 
(especially in the airline industry) "because of the use of this 
financing arrangement to fund corporate  takeover^."^ This interest 
was heightened by the size and volume of many LBOs, culminating 
with the $25.3 billion paid for RJR Nabisco in 1988. 
On the face of it, "LBOs became a stock market game in which 
nearly everyone seemed to win, whether the manager-entrepreneur 
buying its own business, the shareholders receiving a premium for 
their stock ownership or the investment bankers overseeing the 
~rocess."~ 
In the second half of the decade the development of the junk 
bond market, i.e, high risk, high yielding corporate bonds, opened 
another audience of investors since they provided a major portion of 
the financing for LBOs in the late 1980s. As a result, the junk bond 
market further focused concern on the major risk factors inherent to 
LBOs. Junk bonds offered investors higher yields because their 
issues were considered less able to meet their obligations that were 
more established borrowers. 
Many observers contend that LBOs perform a useful and 
perhaps necessary function in downsizing companies (especially 
conglomerates) that have been too large, too bureaucratic, and ineffi- 
cient in using their resources. Carl Icahn, a well-known corporate 
raider, noted that " LBOs and takeovers are part of a free-market 
response working to unseat corporate bureaucracies, control costs, 
and make America more c~mpetitive."~ 
Several analysts refer to a theory of corporate finance that 
shows how the distinction between ownership and control can have 
important implications for the performance of a firm. As this distinc- 
tion becomes less clear, the conflict of interest between owners and 
managers becomes less severe. Since in many LBOs the manager 
becomes the owner, the consequences of managerial actions are 
entirely internalized by the firm's capital reorganization. In this 
manner, "by improving the organizational efficiency of the firm 
through a change of ownership the LBO can increase the firm's 
earnings." lo 
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Michael C. Jensen noted in a recent article published by 
Harvard Business Review that "the emerging private organizations 
that resulted from the takeover and LBO activity of the '80s were 
making remarkable gains in operating efficiencies, employee produc- 
tivity, and shareholders' value."" Consistent with modern finance 
theory, the private organizations are not managing to maximize 
earnings per share but rather to maximize value."12 Jensen further 
noted that "over the long term, LBOs enhance U.S. economic perfor- 
mance relative to our most formidable competitor, Japan."13 
Other proponents of LBOs argue that  they are justified on 
economic fundamentals since "they would bring tremendous 
benefits to the American economy, as  managers, driven by the 
need to service and pay debt, employ corporate assets  more 
efficiently, or sell them to those that 
Another proponent argued, "By placing ownership in the  
hands of a small group of investors and managers with powerful 
debt-driven incentives to improve productivity, companies can't 
help but shape up."15 
Others Have a Different View Concerning LBOs. 
LBOs have been the subject of intense criticism and public 
debate. Many critics have expressed concern about the potential 
risks associated with LBOs. These concerns have been predicated 
implicitly on the notion that changes in the firm's financial struc- 
ture have no positive real effects on the firm's output since a post- 
buyout firm must direct its funds to meet growing debt service 
instead of investing them in research and development or expan- 
sionary activities ( a major ingredient for success in the hospitality 
industry). Indeed, the reduction in research and development and 
capital expenditures leaves the LBO company poorly positioned 
for the future. 
Moreover, the LBO will leave the firm more vulnerable to 
future economic downturns, and the rise in interest rates will 
place ensuing pressure on cash flows, perhaps jeopardizing the 
firm's existence. 
Many are also alarmed about the social value of LBOs. These 
doubts stem from the bad effects of wealth distributions, increased 
instability of the economy, and possible loss to society. A typical 
post-buyout s t ra tegy  i s  to  cu t  costs  i n  order  t o  increase  
profi tabil i ty a n d  ensu re  t h a t  t h e  company can  mee t  deb t  
payments. This results in the  layoff of employees, closing of 
divisions, and reduction of expenditures on research, development, 
and expansionary activities. "For example, Safeway Stores 1986 
LBO would seem to be the model buyout in terms of productivity 
and operating profits. Yet, a two-month investigation revealed 
enormous human costs. The company dropped ten of thousands of 
employees from its payroll. Moreover, many employees found the 
post-buyout working environment more difficult with its high 
pressure quota systems.16 
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LBOs May Have Positive Impact On Shareholders 
There is empirical evidence that suggests that LBOs have had 
positive effects on the target firm's stock prices. Lehn and Poulsen 
found that the "cumulative daily abnormal returns from 20 days 
before to 20 days after the LBO announcement averaged 20.54 
percent across the firms included in a sample during the period 
1980-1987."17 Similarly, Torabzadeh and Bertin found tha t  
"announcements of LBOs have significant positive effects on the 
target firm's stock prices based on a study of 48 LBOs occurring from 
1982 to 1985."lR The empirical observation that the purchase price of 
an LBO is on the average considerably higher than the market price 
before an LBO announcement suggests that these transactions have 
increased the firm's value and, hence, shareholders' wealth. 
The issue of whether LBOs are productive has also received atten- 
tion from researchers. Several recent studies of post buyout perfor- 
mance provide evidence suggesting that these transactions on the 
average have actually improved the firm's performance. For example, 
'Yago reports one study's findings that target firms of management 
buyouts are less likely to close plants that are other firms."lg 
A study by Steven Kaplan provides evidence tha t  "LBOs 
increase operating efficiency without massive layoffs or big cuts in 
research and development. A sample of 48 larger MBOs completed 
between 1980 and 1986 experienced average operating income 
increases of 42 percent from the year prior to the buyout to the third 
year after the buyout. At the same time, cash flow increased by 96 
percent during the same period."20 
A study by Abbie Smith provided further support that signifi- 
cant increases in operating returns resulted from management 
 incentive^."^' Smith's study comprised 58 MBOs completed during 
the period 1977 and 1986. Palmeri also found that "the stocks of 70 
LBO target firms that subsequently went public performed signifi- 
cantly better than the market since the public offering."22 
In a 1989 study of financial performance, Pound and Gordon 
found that firms issuing high-yield securities experienced increases 
in cash flow, earnings, dividend payments, and sales. Long-term and 
short-term growth also irnpr~ved."~~ 
LBO Activity Has Effect on Industry 
The prevalance of LBOs in the hospitality industry during the 
1980s has changed the structure of the industry (especially the food 
service industry) and is expected to have a long-term powerful 
impact on its hture. 
Table 1 shows the LBO activity in the hospitality industry from 
1984 to 1989. Although the lodging or airline segments of the 
industry did not actively participate in the LBO craze of the middle 
and late '80s, the airline industry had three major and highly-publi- 
cized proposed buyouts in 1989 (i.e, United Airlines, American 
Airlines, and NWA). Yet, only one, NWA, was actually consummated, 
becoming the "largest buyout of 1989." 
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Food Lodging Airline ! service 1 I ! 
Table 1 
LBOs in the Hospitality Industry 1984-1989 
Source: Mergers and Acquisitions, 1984-1990. 
* Several divisional LBOs did not disclose dollar value. 
Year Number of Transactions 
It is evident from Table 1 that most of the LBO activity occurred 
in the food service industry, pealung in 1988. "All LBO activity centers 
around companies with strong, stable, and growing cash flows and the 
restaurant industry provides that." 24 However, the largest LBOs in the 
food service industry took place in 1984 and 1985. The mean value of 
LBOs went down aRer 1985 because there were smaller companies or 
divisions of larger companies going private during those years. 
Nonetheless, there was a dramatic increase in the mean and total 
value of LBO activity in 1989 as a result of two major LBOs completed 
in that year (i.e., NWA and TW Services). 
Table 2 shows the five largest LBOs in the hospitality industry 
between 1984 and 1989. The two largest LBOs were consummated in 
1989. A brief review of the five largest LBOs follows. 
1989 Marks Three Large LBOs 
NWA Inc., parent of Northwest Airlines, became "the largest 
LBO negotiated during 1989."z5 The $3.58 billion buyout was led by 
an  investor group t ha t  included former Marriott executives, 
Frederick Malek, Alfred Checci, and Gary Wilson. The LBO was 
financed entirely by equity investment and bank loans, thereby not 
including junk bonds. In June 1990 Frederick B. Rechtschler was 
named president and chief executive officerz6 and NWA announced 
plans "to spend $422 million improving i ts  food, upgrading i t s  
aircraft interiors and retraining its  employee^."^^ 
As of March 1990 "NWA reduced its $3.35 billion in debt to $2.1 
billion, placing it in a better position than a number of other airlines. 
But, NWA still faces some financial hurdles that have been raised a 
little higher by the crisis in the Persian G~lf ."~ '  
Mean Value* 
(in millions) 
Total Value* 
(in millions) 
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Table 2 
The Five Largest LBOs in the Hospitality lndustry 
(1 984-1 989) 
Year Company Industry Total Value 
Segment (in millions) 
1.1989 NWA Airline $3,580.0 
2.1989 TW Services Food service 1,700.0 
3.1984 ARA Services Food service 882.5 
4. 1985 Motel 6 Lodging 881.5 
5.1989 Days Inn Lodging 765.0 
TW Services management and Coninston Partners (a New York 
investment firm) formed TW Holdings to buy TW Services in 1989. 
In acquiring TW Services, the restaurant industry's fourth largest 
operator, "Coninston for the first time owned a company, since until 
then it usually had been a major shareh~lder ."~~ For nearly nine 
months between mid-1988 and 1989, Coninston was rentless in its 
chase of TW Services. Finally in December 1989, Coninston 
completed the LBO "by restructuring an original deal based on junk 
bonds whereby Coninston was forced to invest more equity and rely 
more heavily on bank loans."30 
Since the buyout, TW Services has been selling a number of non- 
strategic subsidiaries for the express purpose of reducing debt. Yet, 
"TW Services flagship operations (i.e., Denny's and Canteen) have 
been infused with expansion and remodeling dollars."31 
In its fiscal year 1989, TW Services lost $57.3 million (on a 5 
percent increase in revenues to $3.4 billion) due to interest costs and 
the loss of feeding contracts a t  defense and auto plants."32 "In the 
third quarter ending September 30, 1990, TW Services reported a 
$3.3 million loss compared to $44.2 million loss in the preceding 
year's quarter, after writing down $60 million in non-recurring 
related expenses."33 
In December 1984, ARA Services (a Philadelpia-based contract 
feeder) was bought by a management-led buyout team for $882.5 
million as a means to protect A M  from takeover efforts of various 
potential bidders. "ARA's selling shareholders received $71.75 a 
share, a windfall considering AFW's selling price before takeover talk 
was in the mid-$40~."~~ As a result, the members of management 
who participated in the LBO attained "31 percent ownership of the 
company, putting up 2 percent of the capital and borrowing the rest 
against ARA's assets."35 
"In just a few months after the buyout, AFW reduced its total 
debt by $41 million (from just over $1 billion, including $150 million 
in loans before the 
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"In January 1990, ARA redeemed all its 16.5 percent subordi- 
nated debt at  par by borrowing $151.7 million under a credit facility. 
Additionally, in April 1990 the company issued, through a private 
placement, $125 million of 12 percent subordinated debt due in 
2000."37 ARA Services ranked number one among contract feeders in 
both 1989 and 1990 by number of U.S. units and number three by 
systemwide sales, according to Nation's Restaurant News Survey.38 
Motel 6, the nation's largest economy chain, went private in 
February 1985 in a $881 million LBO (including $125 million equity 
and $756 debt) orchestrated by Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and 
Company and a new management team. In October 1986,"15 percent 
of Motel 6 went public through a master limited partnership (equity 
investors still owned 52 percent)."39 
In July 1990 Motel 6 agreed to be acquired by French-based hotel 
giant Accor S.A. for $1.3 billion in cash. "Investors who paid $13.50 a 
unit when the public offering was completed in 1986 will nearly double 
their money in four years."40 Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and Company 
and other participating investors "will receive a return of five times 
their original investment of $125 million."41 Helped by a radio adver- 
tising campaign, Motel 6 increased its occupancy rates to an average of 
77 percent (from 67 percent) and expanded to 64,000 rooms (from 
42,000 rooms) between 1984 and 1989. 
Tollman Hundley Corporation (Days Inn's largest franchisee) 
acquired Days Inn of America for $765 million in 1989 ($90 million in 
cash and the assumption of $675 million debt). As of November 1990, 
"Days Inn has total long-term debt of $744 million, all but $5 million of 
which was inherited from the Days Inn's previous owner, Reliance 
Group Holdings, Inc. (Reliance took Days Inn private in 1988)."42 
As of this writing, Days Inn Corporation is saddled with large, 
high-interest debt and has missed some repayments. It is trying to 
overhaul its capital structure. "Days Inn's two primary problems are 
the average interest rate on the high-risk, high-yield debt Gunk 
bonds) is extraordinary high (i.e., 14 percent) and most of the debt is 
due for repayment in the next few years. The company is in default 
on a total of $355 million of long-term, privately-placed debt."43 AS a 
result, Moody's Investor Services lowered Days Inn's subordinated 
debt ratings from Ca to Caa. 
LBOs Produced Conglomerates in Food Service Industry 
The wave of LBOs and takeovers has reshaped the food service 
industry in recent years and has produced a number of restaurant 
conglomerates, among them American Restaurant Group, Paragon 
Restaurants, TW Services, and Restaurant Enterprises. 
American Restaurant Group comprises the former Saga Corpor- 
ation Restaurant group (e.g., Grandy's, Black Angus, and Velvet 
Turtle). "The LBO was completed in 1987 by former W.R. Grace 
Restaurant chief executive Anwar Soliman and his partners, who 
paid an estimated $275 million to buy the group from Marriott 
Corporation upon its acquisition of Saga."44 
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Paragon Restaurants, formerly Vicorp Specialty Restaurant 
Group, was formed in 1986 "when Vicorp Chainnan Gordon Miles 
and a top management team completed the divisional LBO of Vicorp 
Specialty Restaurants, a subsidiary of Vicorp C ~ r p . " ~ ~  Paragon 
Restaurant Group comprises 54 Hungry Hungerhlountain Jacks 
Steak Houses, 33 Rusty Pelican Restaurants (acquired in 1987), and 
16-unit Carlos Murphy's Restaurants. In 1990 "a Japanese restau- 
rant company, Kyotaru Co. Ltd., agreed to buy the Paragon Steak 
House units."46 
TW Services, formerly a wholly-owned subsidiary of Transworld 
Corp., acquired Denny's for $843 million in 1987. As a result, TW 
Services operates some of the best-known food service concepts in the 
industry, including Canteen (the nation's second contract feeder), 
Denny's ( the largest family-style restaurant) ,  Spar tan Foods 
(operator of Hardee units and owner of Quincy steak chain), and El 
Pollo Loco (quick-service chicken chain). 
After acquiring Denny's in 1987, including the assumption of $625 
million debt remaining from Denny's 1985 LBO, "TW Services 
intended to maximize cash flow by rapidly expanding Denny's and El 
Pollo Loco chains through franchising and upgrading Denny's service, 
menu, and In December 1989 a New York investment firm, 
Coninston Partners, completed the  LBO of TW Services, thus  
becoming one of the nation's largest food service operators. In 1990 TW 
Services commenced a consolidation of its $3.7 billion empire. 
Restaurant Enterprises Group comprises the former W.R. Grace 
Restaurant Company and its extensive dinner house holdings. In 
1986 W.R. Grace Company, needing capital in order to buy back its 
stock, sold a 51 percent stake in W.R. Grace full-service restaurant 
division to a management-led buyout group for $580 million. "The 
group, spearheaded initially by Anwar Soliman, the vice-president of 
W.R. Grace Restaurant division, and eventually completed by 
Norman Habermann, acquired W.R. Grace full-service restaurants, 
including El Torito, Houlihans, Carrows, and Co~o 's ."~~ 
Some Hospitality Firms Experienced Reverse LBOs 
Public companies that  go private via a n  LBO can typically 
expect another restructuring within three to five years after the 
buyout. A reverse LBO indicates tha t  the firm became (or was 
acquired) by a publicly-held company. This is especially important for 
capital intensive companies since it is very difficult to remain private 
for an  extended period of time as a result of the constant pressure of 
high debt. 
Starting in 1986 several LBOs completed in the early or middle 
'80s began to cash in, thereby taking fkll advantage of the high stock 
prices that prevailed in those years. A case in point is Motel 6. Just a 
year after the $881 million LBO completed in 1985, Kohlberg, 
Kravis, Roberts, and Company sold 15 percent of the company to the 
public for $13.50 a unit using the master limited partnership vehicle 
while keeping control of the company. 
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Another company able to cash in returning huge earnings to the 
LBO participants was Foodmaker, Inc., the parent of the Jack-in-the- 
Box fast-food chain. In 1985 an investment group led by Foodmaker's 
president and chief executive officer Jack Goodall bought the division 
from Ralston Purina for $430 million. In early 1987 "Foodmaker sold 
four million shares to the public a t  $13.50 each, thereby tripling the 
market  value of the  equity stake of the  the LBO partners."4g 
However, late in 1988, Foodmaker decided to go private again in a 
new management-led LBO for $247 million. According to Jack 
Goodall, "The market has undervalued Foodmaker stock prices in 
spite of the big success experienced by Jack-in-the-Box with new 
product offerings and impressive sales growth. Investors continued 
to back away from Foodmaker because of its alarming 5 to 1 debt to 
equity ratio helped by its purchase of Chi-Chi's Mexican restaurant 
chain in April 1988 for $235 million."s0 
Future Outlook Is Cloudy For LBOs 
After an unprecedented wave of LBOs in the '80s, 1989 "may be 
remembered more for the deals that  failed, especially the $6.79 
billion proposed managemenuunion led buyout of UAL, parent of 
United Airlines, that, according to many analysts, triggered the 
mini-stock crash of October 1989."'l 
The collapse of the junk bond market made it increasingly diffi- 
cult for buyouts to raise capital. This resulted in many deals falling 
apart and being in need of restructuring (e.g., TW Services). "Only 16 
LBOs valued over $10 million were completed in the first quarter of 
1990 in all industries, a 71 percent drop from the 56 completed in the 
first quarter of 1989."52 
Moreover, more and more LBOs are running into financial trouble. 
As a result, lenders are becoming increasingly wary of financing highly- 
leveraged transactions, and many back away from LBO lending. 
Deleveraging has become trendy in the 1990s. When LBO funds try to 
cash out by selling the company, they often can't get top prices. 
Some LBOs fell in default on loan agreements because of 
decreasing profitability. As an example, Service America, the number 
four contract feeder in the nation, defaulted on a $195 million loan from 
General Electric Credit Corporation, the senior creditor on the $500 
management-led buyout completed in 1987. In June 1990, Service 
America informed the SEC "that as a result of posting no earnings for 
the fiscal year 1990 (violating terms of the loan agreement), the 
company was to submit a restructuring plan that included a new bond 
offering on the company's $127 million subordinated  debenture^."^^ 
Service America's "financial health was adversely affected by 
three events: the near collapse of the high interest-high yield junk 
bond market, the plant closings and layoffs among customers in the 
auto and defense industries where Service America had major 
contracts, and a charge related to the relocation of offices and sever- 
ance pay needed to satisfy contracts of employees that were let go 
after the LBO."" 
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In spite of the slowdown in LBO activity, an article published in 
The New York rimes on November 23,1990, reported that "two major 
LBO specialists (Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, and Company and Forts- 
mann, Little and Co.) are trying to persuade pension funds and other 
institutional investors to replenish their funds so that they can buy 
more ~ompanies ."~~ However, future deals are expected to require 
more equity financing, thereby reducing the astronomical returns of 
the past decade. 
Increased Corporate Debt Might Increase Future Recessions 
The proliferation of LBOs and other highly-leveraged transac- 
tions during the past decade has added debt to the financial system. 
Because of this increased debt burden, a major future concern is 
"that bankruptcy and near-bankruptcy of LBOs and other heavily 
indebted firms might increase the severity of a future (or perhaps 
current) recession caused by factors other than the debt."56 That is, 
the bankruptcy risk will probably contribute to the severity of a 
given recession. Indeed, the bankruptcy filings of Campeau and 
Resorts International has raised anxieties about what will happen to 
the economy if the LBOs of the 1980s should crash in the 1990s. 
"During the past decade, debt as a percentage of total capital has 
grown from 34 to 49 percent (at non-financial companies) whereas 
interest coverage has decreased 4.6 to 3.3 times."57 "In dollar terms, 
corporations took on $700 billion of additional debt from 1984 to 
1988, with total debt rising to $1.9 trilli~n."~' Analysts at  Moody's 
Investors Services forecast that defaults will rise about 10 percent on 
junk bond issuers in 1990 without forecasting recession. "The total 
dollar value of all these defaults would be approximately $20 billion, 
a figure that does not include the enormous costs of bankruptcy."5g 
Nonetheless, Michael Jensen contends that critics of leverage 
fail to appreciate "that insolvency in and of itself is not always 
something to avoid and that the costs of becoming insolvent are 
likely to be much smaller in the new world of high leverage than in 
the old world of equity-dominated balance sheets."60 
'There Are Lessons to be Learned From LBOs 
As the 1990s begin, the future climate of LBOs looks uncertain. 
Higher debt burdens of the past decade, better known as the 
"excesses of the 1980s," suggest increased risk of financial failure 
and could exacerbate the severity of a future (or ongoing) recession 
or slowdown in economic activity. Indeed, the market has curbed 
buyout activity as the classic LBO loses its luster due to the collapse 
of the junk bond market while emitting dangers of sending compa- 
nies into bankruptcy. 
The role of corporate debt has long been debated. Critics contend 
that growing indebtedness has hobbled companies and robbed them of 
their future. Conversely, the LBO activity of the past decade provides a 
good illustration of how management can generate higher productivity 
gains, and magnification of returns on investment, at the expense of 
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subjecting the firm to greater financial risk. Indeed, empirical 
research, though preliminary, demonstrates that LBOs have provided 
beneficial contributions to corporations and the economy. 
In a book published by the Oxford University Press in early 
1991, Glenn Yago states "that by relying on factual data instead of 
rhetoric we can demystify LBOs and focus our attention on the 
significant variations among them."61 In so doing, we can identify 
those factors of financial management structure in LBOs that 
optimize their social, economic, and financial impact. 
There might be fewer LBOs in the 1990s, yet alternative vehicles 
that emulate the benefits of the LBO insofar as productivity gains 
should replace the classic LBO. The real challenge to the hospitality 
industry is to design innovative ways that provide management incen- 
tives more nearly as they are in LBOs, keeping in proper perspective 
the entrepreneurial spirit that will always be present in the industry. 
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